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Abstract 
 
This article uses a structural VAR approach to study the different shocks to the monetary 
performance in the two decades of the U.S. economy prior to the 2008 financial crisis. By using 
the Federal Fund Rate as a measure of change in monetary policy, the study shows that interest 
rate expectation is informative about the future movement of Federal Fund Rate and the 
anticipated monetary policy should be one of the crucial reasons in causing monetary and 
financial deterioration in the U.S. economy. The article discusses a possible conjecture of a low 
interest rate trap when a persistent and prolonged low interest rate regime led to financial 
instability.  
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I Introduction  
 Since banks and hedge funds have invested heavily in subprime mortgage backed 
securities, few have predicted that the U.S. subprime mortgage industry could lead to a 
worldwide credit crunch when the Fed takeover the two mortgage-based security companies and 
the closure of Lehman Brothers. Efforts have been made to rescue the subsequent economic 
collapses (Financial Services Authority, 2009; French et al., 2010; IMF, 2009). The 2008 crisis 
has raised the relevance of monetary fundamentals (Taylor and Williams, 2009; Taylor, 2009). 
Schwartz (2009) explained that expansive monetary policy, flawed financial innovations and 
collapse of trading contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 Studies on the U.S. monetary economy have identified five monetary features under Alan 
Greenspan’s chairmanship (7/1985 to 8/2005) of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The practice of a 
direction-known interest-rate smoothing policy showed a stepwise interest rate trend. It has the 
advantage of financial stability and certainty, but since it could be anticipated, the Fed could not 
respond swiftly to shocks, and the resulting inflation variability might have introduced instability 
and volatility (Bullard and Mitra, 2007; Caplin and Leahy, 1996; Goodhart, 1996; Cecchetti, 
1996). The Fed practiced inflation-targeting and an open acknowledgement for low long-run 
inflation (Mankiw, 2002; Blinder and Reis, 2005; Goodfriend, 2005; Bernanke and Mishkin, 
1997). Monetary discretions made without pre-commitment to future course of action had 
resulted in uncertainty and time-inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Fischer, 1990; Barro 
and Gordon, 1983; Bryant et al., 1993, McCallum, 1988). The adoption of the Taylor rule called 
for changes in the Federal Fund Rate in response to changes in the price level, although there 
were periods of deviation (Taylor, 1993; Yellen, 2004; Mehra and Minton, 2007; Blinder and 
Reis, 2005; Woodford, 2001). The personalization of monetary policy (Greenspan put) has led to 
a belief that stock markets would be saved when it went down but would not intervene to stop it 
from rising (Miller et al., 2002). 
 This article examines the monetary fundamentals of the U.S. economy in the two decades 
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. The monthly U.S. data are obtained from the DataStream 
and International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the sample period between 1989.1 and 2008.7 
prior to financial crisis in September. A structural VAR approach is used to study monetary 
shocks in the two decades of the U.S. economy. Section II examines the monetary performance 
and conjectures a “low interest rate trap” that arises from the prolonged low interest rate regime. 
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Section III and IV present the empirical methodology and the empirical findings, respectively. 
Section V concludes. 
 
II Monetary Performance and Conjecture 
  Figure 1 shows the performance of ten U.S. variables prior to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Real GDP and real investment show the level of economic activities. The monthly real GDP and 
real investment data are constructed from quarterly data by the state space approach with the 
monthly industrial production data serving as the interpolator variable, assuming that the 
interpolation is describable as an AR(1) process. The U.S. recession in the mid-1980s has 
resulted in prolonged economic weakness with a fall in real GDP and real investment until 1992. 
 The nominal economic variables include S&P500 and home mortgages; they both were 
bullish and increased continuously to a historical high level until early 2008. For example, the 
Nasdaq Composite Index lost half of its points between March and December, 2000, and 
declined further after the 2001 terrorist attack. In the real estate market, the 1995 Community 
Reinvestment Act was reformed, while the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act exempted tax from profits 
made from sales of residences up to US$0.5 million for married couples. Home ownership 
peaked in 2004, but signs on the end of the housing boom appeared in 2005. In early 2007, the 
problem of subprime mortgage surfaced with Bear Stern closed one of its funds.  
 While the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) excludes the price influence of food and 
energy, the drastic increase in the world price of oil (OPW) has affected the U.S. economy. The 
inclusion of OPW ensures that the estimation model will not suffer from the ‘price puzzle’ 
problem (Sims, 1992, Sims et al., 1996; Christiano et al., 1996). The core CPI has increased 
continuously, and followed closely the OPW trend. The OPW has shown a steady trend in the 
1990s, but has increased rapidly since 1999.  
 The fourth chart shows the Federal Fund Rate (FFR) and the nominal exchange rate (EX) 
of the U.S. dollar against the British pound is used as the unit of measure in capital flows. A 
sustained upward movement in EX since 2002 showed that there was capital outflow due 
probably to the historical low level of FFR. The two indicators of consumer confidence index in 
12-month interest rate higher (RH) and 12-month interest rate same (RS) are used as measures 
on consumer behavior and the dynamic response of the economy to shocks in interest rate 
expectation. These two variables tend to move in the opposite direction, though the former has 
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remained high at different time periods, and has fluctuated more than the latter. The interest rate 
expectation of consumers is highly volatile at around 35% to 75% from 1989 to 1993, when 
investors did not seem to have definite expectation on the future interest rate. 
 
 
Figure 1 Log U.S. Variables 
 
 The FFR trend shows two prolonged low interest rate periods (1993-1995 and 2002-
2004), with a clear downward movement in 1989-1994 when it was lowered from 6% to 1.75% 
in 2001. Economic recovery that began in 1992 suggested that the low interest rate policy could 
have stimulated the U.S. economy. After the dotcom bubble in March 2000, the Fed took 11 
5 
 
steps to lower interest rates. Changes in interest rate expectations often occurred in months ahead 
of the FFR movement, implying a full anticipation of the monetary policy by investors. Starting 
from 2004, the adjustment on the FFR was not effective in controlling the overheated real estate 
market. The increase in the FFR from 1% to 1.25% on June 30, 2004, brought a two-year upward 
trend. This could be due to the full anticipation by investors, as high interest rate expectations 
remained steady between 2004 and 2006, though one could interpret that the low FFR between 
2002 and 2004 have stimulated investment, and continued to impact output till 2006. 
 Once investors’ prediction on monetary policy became more accurate over time, interest 
rate movements might become ineffective in stabilizing business cycles and promoting long-term 
growth. The monetary conjecture in Figure 2 stylizes the steps and responses in Greenspan’s 
interest-rate policy. When the interest rate fell (arrow “a”) and if investors could fully anticipate 
the next round of interest rate movements, investors would have waited till the interest rate has 
fallen to its lowest possible level. The initial fall in the interest rate might not lead to much 
economic adjustment (Lucas, 1981; Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Modigliani, 1977; Barro, 1976). 
As such, policymakers might think that a further drop in interest rates was needed in order to 
stimulate investment. It was probable that when the interest rate had reached a very low level, 
“b”, investors would then borrow extensively. The extremely low interest rate now would 
encourage unproductive, low-return and speculative bubble-prone varieties.  
 The rapid increase in investment at the low interest rate could produce overheating that 
called for policy reversal (arrow “c”). The initial reversal in interest rates could even lead to a 
rise in investment as investors expected higher future borrowing cost. The rise in interest rate 
would soon lower economic activities. Those who have borrowed at the lowest interest rate at “b” 
would now face a repayment problem. By the time the interest rate reached a high level, “d”, 
economic slowdown emerged and the authority would then have to revise the interest rate 
downward, producing another round of stepwise downward movement in interest rate policy 
(arrow a’, b’ and c’). 
 When investors could fully anticipate the interest rate movements, fragile investors would 
wait until interest rate reached the lowest possible level. For example, home ownership was 
encouraged during the second term of the Clinton administration. As property prices rise the 
demand for property also rises as home buyers now feared that property prices would soon rise 
further. Home buyers without full financial credibility were prepared to hedge against the 
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expected rising property price. The monetary conjecture in Figure 2 shows that the economy 
could have been “trapped” at the lowest interest rate levels at points b and b’, as investors have 
got used to the low interest rate and monetary authority found it difficult to maintain a higher 
level of interest rate. A prolonged low interest rate regime could have encouraged financial and 
property speculations that cumulated to form the roots of a financial bubble. A stepwise interest 
rate smoothing policy could eventually produce an unsustainable and cyclical form of monetary 
policy that helped more to fuel financial instability than to build up sustainable economic 
capacity. The economy was effectively addicted to a low interest rate regime, making financial 
resources cheap and promoting low-productivity. While the Fed attempted to manage the 
business cycle, the interest rate policy could have led to a trade-off in sustainable long-run 
growth. 
 
Figure 2 Conjecture of a Low Interest Rate Trap 
 
III Model Identification 
 The “low interest rate trap” can be studied using U.S. data to show if interest rate 
followed a stepwise movement and investors anticipated fully its movement. A structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model (Sims and Zha, 2006; Kim and Roubini, 2000) is used to 
incorporate the interest rate expectation of investors to show that monetary policy could become 
ineffective and/or would promote speculation when it is fully anticipated. 
 The following SVAR system expresses the contemporaneous interactions between the 
variables in structural form: 
r 
t 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a’
a 
b’ 
c’ 
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 0( ) t tB L Y e  ,         (1) 
where B(L) is a n x n matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L; Yt is a n x 1 vector of variables, 
and  et  is a n x 1 vector structural disturbances which is identical independent normal with var (et) 
=  . The  is a diagonal matrix and the diagonal elements are the variances of structural 
disturbances such that each structural disturbance can be assigned explicitly to particular 
equations. Let  B0  be the contemporaneous coefficient matrix on  L
0
  in the structural form, and 
let  
0 ( )B L   be the coefficient matrix in B(L) without contemporaneous coefficient  B0. The matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator, L, is expressed as: 
 
0
0( ) ( )B L B B L  .         (2) 
Consider the reduced form VAR equation: 
 0 ( )t t tY A L Y u   ,         (3) 
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator, L, and μ t is a vector of reduced-form 
disturbances with no structural interpretation. Multiply 
1
0B

 to the structural form equation: 
 
1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1( ) ( )t t t t tY B B B L Y B e A L Y u 
  
       .     (4) 
The parameters of reduced form VAR equation are related to the parameters of the SVAR 
equation: 
 
1 0
0( ) ( )A L B B L
 .         (5) 
The reduced form residuals are related to the structural disturbances: 
 
1
0t tu B e
 ,           (6) 
and its covariance matrix is: 
 
'' 1 1
0 0( )t tE u u B B
     .        (7) 
 The reduced form residuals become the linear combinations of the structural disturbances. 
Equation (7) suggests that the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is not diagonal, 
and the right hand side of the equation has ( 1)n n   free parameters to be estimated. Since   
contains ( 1) / 2n n   parameters, the parameters in the SVAR equation cannot be identified 
without restriction. To achieve identification, ( 1) / 2n n   restrictions are needed. By 
normalizing the diagonal elements in 0B  to unity, the identification requires at least 
( 1) / 2n n   restrictions on 0B . A non-recursive SVAR system is used to identify the monetary 
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policy and interest rate expectation shocks and to estimate their effect on output variables. A 
number of zero (exclusion) restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous structural 
parameters, B0 , in Equation (6). The following equations show the identification restrictions: 
, ,
, ,
21
, ,31 32
, ,41 46
51 52 53 54, ,
61 62 63 64 65, ,
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
01 0 0
0 0 1 0
01
1
OPW t OPW t
Y t Y t
CPI t CPI t
FFR t FFR t
RH t RH t
EX t EX t
e u
e ub
e ub b
e ub b
b b b be u
b b b b be u
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
.   (8) 
 The terms on the LHS of Equation (8) show the six sub-equations in the structural model 
represent the unobserved structural shocks, while ui,t are the observed residuals obtained from the 
reduced form of VAR analysis. As oil is imported to the U.S. economy, the first sub-equation 
assumes that OPW is exogenous to the U.S. economy. The second output sub-equation shows 
that output responds mainly to OPW shocks. However, it also assumed that CPI, FFR, RH and 
EX impact on the lag values of output. In order to incorporate the influence of real investment, 
S&P500 and home mortgages, Equation (8) will be tested in three alternative models with real 
investment, S&P500 and home mortgages subsequently replacing output in the second sub-
equation. The output, S&P500 and real investment are considered as the dependent variable in 
each model, and their fluctuation depended on OPW, CPI and so on.  
 The third sub-equation shows the response of CPI with respect only to output and OPW 
shocks. In the S&P500 model identification in the second sub-equation, it is assumed that the 
movement of the S&P500 index return would not result in contemporaneous price level 
fluctuation. The coefficient estimate of 32b  would become zero. We further assume that the 
S&P500 index return will contemporaneously respond to the FFR and EX shocks (Ehrmann and 
Fratzcher, 2004).  A negative relationship between exchange rate and stock return would produce 
a non-zero coefficient estimate for 24b  and 26b (Solnik, 1987; Wong and Li, 2010). 
 The fourth sub-equation is a monetary policy feedback equation, as the Fed adjusted FFR 
in response to the OPW and EX. The monetary policy function does not response to output and 
CPI contemporaneously as it experienced information delays (Sims and Zha, 2006). But 
investors would utilize all market information and would not be subjected to policy delay. The 
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fifth sub-equation represents the interest rate expectation function which is assumed to respond 
contemporaneously to all variables except EX, as short term EX fluctuation would not affect 
investors’ expectation on interest rate. Lastly, the exchange rate equation is assumed to be related 
to all variables in the system of equations.  
 
Table 1 Marginal significance level of monetary indicators and consumer confidence indices  
Sample Period 1989:1-1999:9 2000:1-2008:7 1989:1-2008:7 
Panel A: Forecasted variable M2 FFR M2 FFR M2 FFR 
Real GDP 
Real Investment  
S&P500 
Home Mortgages 
0.776  
0.296 
0.750  
0.294  
0.788  
0.876  
0.956  
0.714   
0.698  
0.093  
0.880  
0.464   
0.266  
0.016  
0.468  
0.128 
0.863 
0.082  
0.937  
0.591 
0.787  
0.097  
0.698  
0.002 
Panel B: Forecasted variable RH RS RL 
FFR (1989:1-1999:9) 
FFR (2000:1-2008:7) 
FFR (1989:1-2008:7) 
0.071  
0.043  
0.213  
0.425  
0.767  
0.494  
0.019  
0.277  
0.254  
Notes: For each row of the forecasted variable, the estimated value represents the marginal 
significance level for omitting six lags of M2 or FFR from an unrestricted OLS equation which 
included a constant, trend, six lags of price level, and six lags of the forecasted variable. RH, 
(RS) and [RL] correspond to consumer confidence index – interest rate higher, (same) and 
[lower] in 12 months. The estimated values in Panel B represent the marginal significance level 
for omitting six lags of RH, RS or RL from an unrestricted OLS equation that included a 
constant, trend, and six lags of the forecasted variable. 
 
 The two sub-sample periods (1989:1-1999:9 and 2000:1-2008:7) used in the analysis of 
the September 2008 crisis reflected the dotcom bubble, change of U.S. leadership in 2000 and 
2001 terrorist attack. Data are expressed in logarithm and first-difference-stationary verified by 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The Granger-causality test is conducted to select 
whether M2 or FFR is appropriate for our analysis (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Sims and Zha, 
1994). Table 1 Panel A shows the marginal significance level that the lags of either M2 or FFR 
should be excluded from the equation. Given that smaller estimates are preferred, FFR is 
superior to M2 in the second sub-sample period but not in the first sub-sample period. For the 
whole sample period, FFR outperformed M2 as a preferred variable in forecasting other variables. 
In forecasting the FFR, Panel B reports the marginal significance levels of consumer confidence 
index on higher (RH), same (RS) or lower (RL) interest rate in 12 months. Among the three 
different periods, RH performs better in the second sub-sample period and the whole sample 
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period, as seen from the smaller value of the estimates. The level of statistical significance for 
RH in the first and second sub-sample periods is 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. RH has 
shown a higher predictive power in the second sub-sample period than in the first sub-sample 
period. FFR is used as a monetary policy indicator while RH is the interest rate expectation 
indicator in the estimation. 
 
IV Empirical Results        
 We examine from Equation (8) the influence of FFR and RH on output, investment, 
S&P500 and home mortgages over the two sub-sample periods. The number of lag length in each 
model is based on the Akaike information criterion. The constant and trend variables are included. 
Table 2 reports the Likelihood Ratio Test results for over-identification restriction, and that 
output, investment and home mortgages are over-identified, while S&P500 is just-identified. The 
p-value corresponds to the hypothesis test of the single over-identification restriction, and a 
coefficient greater than 0.05 indicates that the particular model cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent significance level. Despite the over-identification in some variables that poses unknown 
problems, one can still estimate the matrix presented in Equation (8). 
 
Table 2: Likelihood Ratio Test for Over-Identification 
  χ2 p-value. 
1989:1 - 1999:9   
Real GDP 0.638  0.424  
Real Investment  0.271  0.603  
S&P500 JI JI 
Home Mortgages 0.052  0.820  
2000:1 - 2008:7 
Real GDP 1.015  0.314  
Real Investment  0.241  0.623  
S&P500 JI JI 
Home Mortgages 0.424  0.515  
Note: JI represents just-identified. 
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Table 3: Contemporaneous Coefficients in Structural Models 
    Real GDP   Real Investment   S&P 500   Home Mortgage Amount 
   1989-1999 2000-2008  1989-1999 2000-2008  1989-1999 2000-2008  1989-1999 2000-2008 
b21  0.000  0.000   0.011  0.010   0.023  -0.080   0.218  0.020  
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.113) (0.231)  (0.061) (0.049) 
b24  - -  - -  0.115  -0.510   - - 
  - -  - -  (0.379) (1.593)  - - 
b26  - -  - -  0.582  -1.576   - - 
  - -  - -  (1.267) (5.836)  - - 
b31  -0.009  -0.021   -0.009  -0.021   -0.009  -0.021   -0.008  -0.021  
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
b32  0.209  -0.221   0.045  0.067   - -  0.003  -0.008  
  (0.629) (1.169)  (0.023) (0.033)  - -  (0.003) (0.005) 
b41  -0.050  0.230   -0.298  -0.049   -0.090  -0.213   -0.149  -0.169  
  (0.432) (0.243)  (0.205) (0.126)  (0.267) (0.831)  (0.106) (0.374) 
b46  12.423  6.382   4.872  0.641   -2.596  -5.522   -0.328  -7.166  
  (42.915) (3.619)  (3.621) (1.324)  (6.742) (22.122)  (1.585) (9.560) 
b51  -0.120  0.000   -0.333  -0.066   -0.067  -0.010   -0.197  -0.095  
  (0.349) (0.124)  (0.188) (0.131)  (0.374) (0.213)  (0.159) (0.121) 
b52  13.469  66.201   -5.850  -4.807   1.077  -1.005   0.136  0.278  
  (332.256) (50.998)  (2.579) (1.300)  (2.573) (2.633)  (0.198) (0.202) 
b53  -17.748  -4.672   -8.753  -8.510   -6.627  -4.885   -2.529  -4.699  
  (58.780) (3.738)  (7.501) (3.822)  (8.184) (5.283)  (6.768) (3.492) 
b54  1.781  0.048   0.549  0.044   -0.555  -0.150   -0.200  -0.150  
  (12.281) (0.162)  (0.529) (0.089)  (1.107) (0.672)  (0.224) (0.279) 
b61  -0.165  -0.001   0.017  0.004   -0.150  -0.167   -0.069  0.109  
  (0.534) (0.047)  (0.066) (0.034)  (0.233) (1.130)  (0.045) (0.135) 
b62  81.327  88.150   1.338  1.249   -0.304  2.918   -0.078  0.232  
  (183.497) (27.467)  (0.838) (0.362)  (1.245) (15.105)  (0.046) (0.369) 
b63  -3.991  1.424   -0.031  1.829   1.053  3.773   0.602  -2.177  
  (38.640) (1.434)  (2.985) (1.016)  (2.241) (15.125)  (1.554) (4.252) 
b64  -0.907  -0.363   -0.456  -0.061   0.225  0.734   0.036  0.579  
  (1.328) (0.123)  (0.258) (0.068)  (0.491) (4.127)  (0.162) (0.963) 
b65  0.920  0.064   0.199  -0.021   0.163  0.236   0.061  0.074  
  (3.446) (0.062)  (0.186) (0.026)  (0.378) (2.584)  (0.021) (0.264) 
Note: The numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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Table 4 Variance Decomposition of Real GDP, Real Investment, S&P 500 and Home Mortgages 
  Shock 1 (eOPW)   Shock 3 (eCPI)   Shock 4 (eFFR)   Shock 5 (eRH)   Shock 6 (eEX) 
 1989-99 2000-08  1989-99 2000-08  1989-99 2000-08  1989-99 2000-08  1989-99 2000-08 
Variance decomposition of real GDP           
1 1.4 0.03  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2 1.46 0.94  0.03 1.2  0.05 1.26  0.01 0.22  0.98 0.8 
3 1.81 2.26  0.09 2.09  0.06 3.11  0.03 1.36  1.26 0.68 
5 2.63 3.06  4.97 3.38  0.05 4.96  0.41 6.64  3.14 1.04 
8 3.52 3.81  10.75 8.92  2.82 6.65  0.89 8.56  3.2 1.45 
12 5.62 5.42  10.49 9.73  3.15 7.9  0.98 8.64  3.34 2.03 
Variance decomposition of real investment           
1 1.92 1.39  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2 3.27 3.87  2.88 3.13  0.28 0.62  0.11 1.33  0.16 0.45 
3 4.68 3.32  2.9 7.9  1.22 0.42  0.76 4.24  0.28 0.43 
5 6.51 3  2.78 12.57  2.37 1.89  1.65 8.77  0.31 6.26 
8 6.17 6.88  2.83 10.81  2.34 8.3  1.77 7.87  0.38 6.99 
12 6.25 6.67  2.84 9.58  2.41 8.55  1.8 12.82  0.38 6.43 
Variance decomposition of S&P 500           
1 1.85 0.39  0.15 0.66  1.01 2.31  5.48 1.98  20.32 64.14 
2 5.9 6.09  0.88 1.81  1.41 3.08  7.42 2.12  18.53 58.86 
3 7.25 6.64  0.98 2.25  1.41 6.01  7.31 3.7  18.21 54.07 
5 7.23 7.37  1.07 2.62  1.41 5.89  7.28 3.91  18.18 53.44 
8 7.24 7.35  1.08 2.64  1.41 6  7.28 3.97  18.18 53.31 
12 7.24 7.35  1.08 2.65  1.41 6  7.28 3.97  18.18 53.3 
Variance decomposition of Home Mortgages           
1 8.94 0.16  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
2 9.81 0.14  0.03 1.06  0.36 0.93  0.01 3.97  0.02 1.83 
3 9.82 1.08  0.05 1.09  1.64 1.72  2.74 7.34  0.02 4.13 
5 9.86 8.73  0.22 1.66  1.87 2.47  3 11.76  0.15 8.53 
8 9.86 7.62  0.24 11.14  1.97 6.36  3.02 10.49  0.16 11.58 
12 9.86 7.22   0.24 11.32   1.97 7.62   3.02 11.35   0.16 16.52 
Note: Shock 2 (own shock) is excluded.  
 
 
 Table 3 shows the contemporaneous coefficients in the four structural models. The 
expected relationship of a negative contemporaneous coefficient between S&P500 and FFR (b24 
= -0.510) and between S&P500 and EX (b26  = -1.576) appeared only in the second sub-sample 
period. For the coefficients estimates of the monetary policy feedback equation (the fourth sub-
equation), the estimated coefficient b41 are negative in most cases, while b46 is negative in the 
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S&P500 and home mortgages models. The Fed did increase interest rate when faced with an 
unexpected increase in both OPW and unexpected EX depreciation in the second sub-sample 
period. However, instead of a positive relationship, the unexpected estimated values of b51 and 
b53 are negatively related to the interest rate expectation, implying that investors expected higher 
interest rate when negative OPW or CPI shocks occurred. 
 
Importance of interest rate expectation on real output and alternative variables 
 The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) method is used to investigate the 
contribution of each structural shock in affecting other variables. Table 4 shows that the 
contribution of FFR (shock 4) and interest rate expectation (shock 5) have significantly increased 
in the second sub-sample period in most cases, suggesting that their impact on the variance of the 
real GDP, real investment, and home mortgages in the second sub-sample period was larger than 
in the first sub-sample period. Hence, when interest rate was low, the FFR and interest rate 
expectation become more important. In the case of the variance decomposition of real investment, 
the contribution by CPI (shock 3) and interest rate expectation (shock 5) have outperformed 
other variables in the second sub-sample period, implying that CPI and interest rate expectation 
were more important than other variables. The outperformance can be seen from the larger 
values shown in Table 4. The significance of CPI was probably due to the high OPW in the 
second sub-sample period. The significance of interest rate expectation suggested that investors 
could have anticipated interest rate movement, and acted on their investment decisions 
accordingly.  
  For the variance decomposition of S&P500, the contribution of EX (shock 6) is 
significantly higher than the others, suggesting that the U.S. stock market is heavily influenced 
by EX. The FEVD analysis demonstrates that the higher contribution on the errors in forecasting 
real GDP, real investment and home mortgage is due to the variability in the shocks of FFR 
(shock 4) and interest rate expectation (shock 5) in the second sub-sample period, as seen from 
the larger values of the estimated coefficients for shocks 4 and 5 when compared to other shocks. 
This strongly confirmed that investors have fully anticipated the Fed’s monetary policy, a result 
consistent with the Granger-casualty analysis.  
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Effectiveness of monetary policy and the impact of interest rate expectation (RH) on output 
 If a monetary policy failed to generate an impact expected by the policy makers, one 
possible reason could probably be due to investors’ expectation on interest rate. For example, if 
investors expected the borrowing cost to remain the same, they might not borrow in the initial 
stage of a falling interest rate, but should they subsequently anticipate a reversal in interest rate, 
investor might then choose to borrow before rise in borrowing cost. Investors might show an 
abrupt change in their expectation on interest rate movement. The impulse response functions 
can provide a quantitative measure of the dynamic effects of investors’ interest rate expectation 
changes. For the purpose of comparison, we consider an interest rate expectation shock with a 
structural one standard deviation positive innovation over a horizon of 12 months.  
 Figure 3 illustrates the impulse response functions of real GDP, real investment, S&P500 
and home mortgages to a positive interest rate expectation shock. This enables us to examine the 
long term impact of interest rate expectation had on GDP, investment, S&P500 and home 
mortgages. A positive interest rate expectation shock represented an increase in the percentage of 
the investors who expected the interest rate to rise in the next 12 months. Panel A and Panel B in 
Figure 3 represent the two sub-sample periods, and the upper and lower dashed lines plotted in 
each chart show the two-standard-error bands generated by Monte Carlo techniques. In response 
to an interest rate expectation shock, real GDP responded sharply in the second sub-sample 
period, while S&P500 responded inversely in both periods. One can conclude that a positive 
interest rate expectation shock did encourage speculation in the second sub-sample period. 
 To consider the predictability of investors on the interest rate movement, we examine the 
dynamic response of interest rate expectation to a positive monetary policy shock, meaning that 
when investors expected a high interest rate, the Fed would increase the interest rate. Figure 4 
shows the estimated impulse response functions of interest rate expectation to a monetary policy 
shock using the real GDP equation. Figure 4 Panel A shows that a positive monetary policy 
shock (a rise in interest rate) has generated a negative effect on interest rate expectation until the 
fourth month and then moved around the zero line after the sixth month. On the contrary, a 
positive reaction is shown in Panel B, and the highest impact came in the fourth month. This 
suggested that the positive impact on the interest rate expectation lasted for at least 4 months. 
One would conclude that the interest rate smoothing policy was well anticipated by investors in 
the second sub-sample period. 
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Note: Panel A=1989-1999, Panel B=2000-2008. 
Figure 3 Response of Real GDP, Real investment, S&P500 and Home Mortgages to Interest Rate 
Expectation (RH) 
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Figure 4 Response of Interest Rate Expectation (RH) to Monetary Policy (FFR) Shock  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Response of Price Level (CPI) and Exchange Rate (EX) to Monetary Policy (FFR) 
Shock  
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Dynamic responses to monetary policy (FFR) shocks 
 It is equally important to illustrate the dynamic responses of economic variables to 
monetary policy shocks. The reason for the contractionary monetary policy was to control 
inflation and cool the overheated economy. The response functions of the price level and 
exchange rate as implied by the real GDP are shown in Figure 5. This shows what response CPI 
and exchange rate would have when there was an increase in interest rate. In response to a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, Figure 5 Panel A shows that the price level increased 
slightly in the first sub-sample period, but dropped below zero after the fifth month, confirming 
that contractionary monetary shock did not generate a persistent rise in price level. In Figure 5 
Panel B, the price level dropped after the second month, which is consistent with expectation. It 
is obviously that a contractionary monetary policy shock produced a larger effect in lowering 
inflation rate in the second sub-sample period. In the case of the exchange rate, no significant 
effect can be found between the two sub-sample periods.  
 We next examine the dynamic responses of real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and home 
mortgages to a contractionary monetary policy shock (rise in interest rate) (Figure 6). The results 
of Figure 6 Panel A are expected and consistent. A contractionary monetary policy shock is 
expected to result in a decrease in real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages. In 
particular, it has a significant negative effect on real investment, S&P500 and home mortgages in 
the short run. In Figure 6 Panel B, the responses of real GDP is similar to the first sub-sample 
period, with a sharply increase in real GDP after the fourth month. In the case of home mortgage, 
the response in the second sub-sample period is generally larger than that in the first sub-sample 
period, meaning that an increase in FFR would generate more fluctuation in home mortgage.  
 Significant difference in the response patterns in real investment and S&P500 could also 
be found in the second sub-sample period, implying that stock market behaved differently for the 
same shock in different periods. A sustained increase in real investment and S&P500 could be 
seen in the first few months in the second sub-sample period in response to a contractionary 
monetary policy, and the rising trends reached the peak at the sixth month and the third month, 
respectively, before they both declined. Such a result clearly suggested that investment and stock 
market speculation were encouraged in the short run by a contractionary monetary policy. 
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Figure 6 Response of Real GDP, Real Investment, S&P500 and Home Mortgages to Monetary 
Policy (FFR) Shock 
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Figure 7 Accumulated Response of Real GDP, Real Investment, S&P500 and Home Mortgage 
Amount to Monetary Policy (FFR) Shock 
 
 Figure 7 shows the accumulated responses of real GDP, real investment, S&P500 and 
home mortgage to a contractionary monetary policy. A lower accumulated response of real GDP 
to a contractionary policy shock meant that the increase in FFR would lead to a decrease in GDP. 
In the short run, only real investment was promoted in the second sub-sample period. This meant 
that the increase in FFR would lead to a decrease in real investment. For the S&P500, the 
accumulated response was higher in the second sub-sample period than in the first sub-sample 
period. Most notably, the accumulated responses of home mortgages between the two sub-
sample periods changed drastically. The contractionary monetary policy has successfully reduced 
home mortgages in the first sub-sample period, but has greatly stimulated home mortgages in the 
second sub-sample period, suggesting that there could be other responsible factors. Similarly, the 
contractionary monetary policy shock has produced a larger effect in lowering inflation rate in 
the second sub-sample period. It is reasonable to argue that anticipated monetary policy was the 
crucial reason in generating the sub-prime mortgage crisis that started in late 2007 and caused 
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further deterioration of the U.S. economy. In short, the increase in interest rate had led to a 
decrease in CPI and an increase in home mortgage that gave rise to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
 
VI Conclusion 
 Interest rate expectation plays an important role in the U.S. economy. During 2000-2008, 
a positive interest rate expectation shock did not only encourage investment but speculation in 
the financial markets. Empirical evidence shows that a contractionary monetary policy has 
overheated real investment though it lowered the price level and output. The response of 
economic variables to a monetary policy shock may not follow the conventional wisdom when 
the policy is fully anticipated.  
 This empirical analysis relates the discussion back to the basics of monetary economics, 
and in particular, the problem of monetary policy uncertainties (Friedman, 1968; Poole, 1970; 
Romer and Romer, 1989; Brainard, 1967). Similar to Friedman’s (1948, 1960) idea of a constant 
money supply, it probably would be appropriate for policy makers to pursue an “interest rate 
anchor” such that the adoption of a steady interest rate allows the business cycle to develop, 
evolve around or respond to the interest rate rather than changing the interest rate ostensibly to 
suit the business cycle. 
 The conjecture of a “low interest rate trap” highlighted a monetary phenomenon that 
could give rise to unintended economic consequences. It encouraged low-return investment and 
speculation which were unmatched with economic growth. Investors with full anticipation on the 
movement of the interest rate could result in a business cycle that built around the policy. It is 
preferable to have an effective and steady interest rate anchor that allows the business cycle to 
run its own course and be regulated by private economic activities. The government at most 
needs to fine tune the “interest rate anchor” should the business cycle deviates from normal. 
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